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Strategic Benefits of Referral Services
Abstract

Internet referral services, hosted either by independent third-party infomediaries or by manufacturers serve as
``lead-generators'' in electronic marketplaces, directing consumer traffic to particular retailers. The
conventional wisdom on Internet referral services is that they are valuable to consumers because they can be
used to compare prices and get binding price quotes from retailers. Less clear is the role of such referral
services for the manufacturers and the retailers. In addition, a manufacturer's entry into the online referral
business has implications for pricing, allocation of channel profits and retail competition.
In a model of price dispersion, we investigate the competitive implications of these institutions on retailer
prices and their impact on channel structures and distribution of profits. Models that analyze firm conduct in
distribution channels ( Jeuland and Shugan, 1983; Moorthy, 1987) typically do not consider third-party
infomediaries. In a paper closely related to ours, Chen, Iyer and Padmanabhan (2002) examine how an
infomediary affects the market competition between retailers. However they do not consider the impact of an
upstream manufacturer's referral services on the behavior of downstream players.
We consider a model with a distribution channel consisting of a manufacturer, an infomediary, and two
retailers. We focus, in particular, on the response of the manufacturer to the presence of an infomediary.
Consumers are heterogenous both in their valuations and in search behavior, so that price dispersion exists in
equilibrium. Price dispersion has been extensively studied, both theoretically (Varian, 1980, and Narasimhan,
1988, for example) and empirically. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) and Clemons, Hann and Hitt (2002) find
that price dispersion continues to exist on the Internet.
In our model, the online sales environment results in lower customer acquisition costs. However, it also offers
retailers less information about a consumer's willingness to pay. In the offline channel, consumers physically
walk into stores, and retailers are able to determine willingness to pay, via a costly negotiation process. This
enables them to discriminate offline between high and low valuation consumers. Online, they lose this ability
to discriminate.
In an industry such as the auto industry, purchases are infrequent, with significant time gaps. In such a setting,
it is reasonable to think of consumer preferences changing from one purchase to the next, and hence of a lack
of availability of information online. If purchases were more frequent (e.g., books or CDs), one can think of
more information being available online rather than offline, providing an even stronger reason to divert traffic
online. The impact of online consumer information on retailer pricing strategies has been studied by Ghose, et
al (2002) and Aron, Sunderarajan and Vishwanathan (2001), among others.
We find that, first, the establishment of manufacturer referral services leads to an increase in channel profits
and a reallocation of some of the increased surplus, through the franchise fee, to the manufacturer. The
impetus to increased profits comes from both retailers' ability to price discriminate between informed and
uninformed consumers, and by the lowering of acquisition costs due to diversion of traffic from the offline to
the online channel. Thus the strategic decision by the manufacturer to adopt an online referral service affects
both channel profits achievable and the allocation of profits among channel members.
Second, a higher offline customer acquisition cost (incurred by retailers) is beneficial to the infomediary, but
detrimental for the manufacturer. Conversely, increasing heterogeneity in consumer valuations hurts the
infomediary, but benefits the manufacturer. Higher profits for the non-enrolled translate into higher franchise
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fees for the manufacturer, while the smaller difference in profits between retailers results in lower referral fees
for the infomediary.
Third, online prices are lower than offline prices for the retailer enrolled with the infomediary. The referral
service is essentially used as a price discrimination mechanism, to distinguish between uninformed and
informed consumers. We also how that in equilibrium, with or without the introduction of the manufacturer
referral service, the retailer associated with the infomediary, has higher expected sales and gross profits.
Further, the sales of each retailer remain the same even after the introduction of the manufacturer referral
service.
Fourth, some of the online cost savings are transferred to the consumer, leading to an overall increase in
consumer welfare. This happens both through heightened price competition and an increase in the segment of
consumers which observe the largest set of prices.
Finally, our model provides some insights into the closing efficiency of such referral services. Since a referral
request is not a costless process, a significant parameter which all players need to keep in mind is the average
closing ratio of this mechanism. Our results are in accordance with empirical evidence. We also discuss some
possible extensions to our model and how they would not change the qualitative nature of our main results.
This paper, therefore, offers a different viewpoint on how manufacturers can increase profits by diverting
traffic into online channels. In the auto industry, manufacturers cannot directly sell to consumers. However,
they can extract higher profits from the channel by increasing their franchise fee. This provides them with an
incentive to reduce the acquisition costs in the channel. The tradeoff is that, since consumer purchases in this
industry are infrequent, little information about consumers is available online. Offline, a retailer is able to infer
a consumer's willingness to pay. We show that, for a wide range of parameters, the cost savings dominate any
losses due to absence of online information. Further, in the presence of competition from a third party
infomediary, a manufacturer can use a referral website as a device to regain some control over the channel.
Keywords

Manufacturer Referral Services, Price Dispersion, Acquisition Costs, Franchise Fees, Infomediary
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1

Introduction

Consumers’ affinity for neutral information has led to the emergence of a large number of independent sources on the Internet that offer high-quality information about firms’ products,
their availability and prices, at no cost to consumers. These infomediaries offer consumers
the opportunity to get price quotes from enrolled brick-and-mortar retailers as well as invoice prices, reviews and specifications. While a referral service does not, in fact, “sell” any
product, it does shift much of the consumer search process from the physical platform of the
traditional retailer to the virtual world of the Web. Importantly, Internet referral services
serve as “lead-generators” in electronic marketplaces directing consumer traffic to particular
retailers. This shift in buying behavior from a conventional to an electronic marketplace
is an outcome of big strides undertaken in E-Commerce technology and is significant in its
implications for consumers, manufacturers and retailers.
Consider the auto industry in the U.S., in which manufacturers are prohibited by law from
selling directly to consumers. Both infomediaries and manufacturers now offer web-based
referral services, which are growing in popularity. Industry-wide, 6% of all new vehicles in
2001 were sold through an online buying service, up from 4.7% in 2000.1 In 2001, Autobytel
generated an estimated $17 billion in car sales.2
Given the advent of such third-party referral brokers, the major OEMs like GM and
Ford have set up their own referral websites such as GMBuyPower.com and FordDirect.com.
From these sites, consumers can configure a new car, receive the list price and be led to a
dealer site for inventory and quotes. The payoff to improving such a referral website can
be substantial. It is estimated that an $800,000 effort to fix common website problems can
create $250,000 of additional leads per month at an average manufacturer site.3 Crucially,
manufacturers provide referrals to dealers free of cost, while third-party infomediaries charge
referral fees to participating dealers. Car makers like GM and Ford are routing traffic to
their websites by extending a marketing and advertising alliance with portals such AOL &
Yahoo. Companies such as BMW and Isuzu that instituted heavy offline promotions and
campaigns to drive customers to their websites, have seen the largest increases in automotive
Internet usage.4
The conventional wisdom on Internet referral infomediaries is that they are valuable to
1

“More Car Buyers Hitting the Web First,” www.EcommerceTimes.com, 11/27/01.
“Autobytel Survey,” www.CNET.com, 06/25/02.
3
“Get ROI From Design”, Forrester Report, June 2001.
4
Reagan, K. (2001), “ More Car Buyer Hitting the Web First ”, www. EcommerceTimes.com, November
2

27.

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2003

1

Review of Marketing Science Working Papers, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 2

consumers because they can be used to compare prices and get binding price quotes from
retailers. Less clear is the role of these infomediaries for the manufacturer and the retailers.
In addition, a manufacturer’s entry into the online referral business has implications for
pricing, allocation of channel profits and retail competition. The effect of such referral
competition on the division of channel profits has not been studied previously. Models
that analyze firm conduct in distribution channels (Jeuland and Shugan, 1983; Moorthy,
1987) typically do not consider third-party infomediaries. In a paper related to ours, Chen,
Iyer and Padmanabhan (2002) examine how an infomediary affects the market competition
between retailers. However they do not consider the impact of an upstream manufacturer’s
referral services on the behavior of downstream players. Iyer and Pazgal (2002) study how
an Internet Shopping Agent creates differentiation in ex-ante identical retailers.
We consider a model with a distribution channel consisting of a manufacturer, an infomediary, and two retailers. We focus, in particular, on the response of the manufacturer to
the presence of an infomediary. Consumers are heterogenous both in their valuations and
in search behavior, so that price dispersion exists in equilibrium. Price dispersion has been
extensively studied, both theoretically (Varian, 1980, and Narasimhan, 1988, for example)
and empirically. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) and Clemons, Hann and Hitt (2002) find
that price dispersion continues to exist on the Internet.
In our model, the online sales environment results in lower customer acquisition costs.
However, it also offers retailers less information about a consumer’s willingness to pay. In
the offline channel, consumers physically walk into stores, and retailers are able to determine
willingness to pay, albeit via a costly process. This enables them to discriminate offline
between high and low valuation consumers. Online, they lose this ability to discriminate.
In an industry such as the auto industry, purchases are infrequent, with significant time
gaps. In such a setting, it is reasonable to think of consumer preferences changing from one
purchase to the next, and hence of a lack of availability of information online. If purchases
were more frequent (e.g., books or CDs), one can think of more information being available
online rather than offline, providing an even stronger reason to divert traffic online. The
impact of online information on pricing strategies has been studied by Ghose, et al (2002),
Chen and Iyer (2002), Aron, Sunderarajan and Vishwanathan (2001).

1.1

Research Questions

In this setting, we examine the following questions.
• How does the entry of a referral infomediary affect the optimal pricing strategies of
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retailers in a channel? What strategic implications does it have for a manufacturer?
• If a manufacturer cannot sell directly to consumers, can it still extract higher profits
from the channel by diverting traffic online?
• What is the impact of such referral services on the “closing efficiency”, i.e., the sales
to leads ratio of retailers?
We find that, first, the establishment of manufacturer referral services leads to an increase
in channel profits and a reallocation of some of the increased surplus, through its franchise
fee, to the manufacturer. The impetus to increased profits comes from both retailers’ ability
to price discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers, and by the lowering of
acquisition costs due to diversion of traffic from the offline to the online channel.
Second, a higher offline customer acquisition cost (incurred by retailers) is beneficial to
the infomediary, but detrimental for the manufacturer. Conversely, increasing heterogeneity
in consumer valuations hurts the infomediary, but benefits the manufacturer.
Third, online prices are lower than offline prices for the retailer enrolled with the infomediary. The referral service is essentially used as a price discrimination mechanism, to
distinguish between uninformed and informed consumers. The expected sales and profits of
the infomediary enrolled retailer are higher than those of the other retailer.
Fourth, some of the online cost savings are transferred to the consumer, leading to an
overall increase in consumer welfare. This happens both through heightened price competition and an increase in the segment of consumers which observe the largest set of prices.
Finally, our model provides some insights into the closing efficiency of such referral services. Since a referral request is not a costless process, a significant parameter which all
players need to keep in mind is the average closing ratio of this mechanism. Our results are
in accordance with empirical evidence.
This paper, therefore, offers a different viewpoint on how manufacturers can increase
profits by diverting traffic into online channels. In the auto industry, manufacturers cannot
directly sell to consumers. However, they can extract higher profits from the channel by
increasing their franchise fee. This provides them with an incentive to reduce the acquisition
costs in the channel. The tradeoff is that, since consumer purchases in this industry are
infrequent, little information about consumers is available online. Offline, a retailer is able
to infer a consumer’s willingness to pay. We show that, for a wide range of parameters, the
cost savings dominate any losses due to the absence of online information. Further, in the
presence of competition from a third party infomediary, a manufacturer can use a referral
website as a device to regain some control over the channel.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. In
Section 3 we analyze the offline world without any referral service. Section 4 examines
the effect of the infomediary on retail competition while Section 5 examines the impact
of manufacturer referral services on equilibrium strategies and policies and provides some
empirical corroboration of our results. Section 6 provide some business implications. Section
7 concludes with a brief summary of the main results. All proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.

2

Model

2.1

Retailers and Manufacturer

We consider a market with a single manufacturer and two competing retailers, D 1 and D2 .
The manufacturer charges the retailers a franchise fee, F . The wholesale price of the good
charged to the retailers, W , is treated as fixed.
We analyze the retailing world under three scenarios: (i) with no referral services (ii)
with a referral infomediary, and (iii) with a referral infomediary as well as a manufacturer
referral website. The referrals are online, so in scenarios (ii) and (iii), the retailers make
some online sales in addition to offline ones. All sales are offline in scenario (i).
Retailers incur an additional acquisition cost, δ, for each offline sale. δ represents the
difference in acquisition costs between offline and online sales. This includes the cost of time
spent in providing information about the product when a consumer walks into a physical
store. It also includes the cost of time involved in determining the willingness to pay of
consumers, offering test drives, and paperwork. Ratchford (2002) shows that the Internet
leads to a considerable reduction in consumer time spent with dealer/manufacturer sources.
Since our results depend only on the difference between offline and online acquisition costs,
the online is set to a benchmark of zero. The tradeoff faced by a retailer is that, offline, it
can perfectly observe a consumer’s valuation via face-face interaction. This is tied to the
offline acquisition cost; the interaction process, while costly to the retailer, also yields greater
information about a consumer’s valuation for the good. Hence, the offline price offered to a
consumer depends on this valuation, allowing for price discrimination. Online, the valuation
is hidden from the retailer, so it loses the ability to price discriminate in this fashion.
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2.2

Referral infomediary

The referral infomediary enrols one retailer, D2 , and allows consumers to obtain an online
price quote from this retailer. The infomediary charges the retailer a fixed referral fee of K. 5
If the infomediary enrolled both retailers, Bertrand competition would prevail in the online
segments, with prices equal to marginal cost, as shown by Chen, Iyer and Padmanabhan
(2002). Therefore, the infomediary can charge a higher fee when it enrols just one retailer.
In practice, too, dealers are assigned exclusive geographic territories by infomediaries (see
Moon 2000).

2.3

Consumers

The market consists of a unit mass of consumers. Consumers are heterogenous both in
terms of their valuation, and in their search behavior, which determines the market segment
they belong to. A consumer’s valuation for the good is either high, VH , or low, VL , where
VH > VL > 0. The proportion of high valuation consumers is λH , and that of low valuation
consumers is λL = 1 − λH . Each consumer buys either zero or one unit of the product.
Consumers belong to different market segments. The notion of market segments allows
for the existence of consumers with both different levels of awareness about alternate avenues
for price quotes, and different search behaviors. Depending on the segment she belongs to,
a consumer observes a different set of prices for the good. A consumer with valuation j
(j = H, L) buys the product if her net utility is positive; i.e., vj − Pmin ≥ 0, where Pmin is the
minimum price offered to this consumer. To keep the setup generalized, we do not assume
any correlation between consumer valuations and search behavior.
There are three distinct consumer segments: a proportion α1 of “uninformed” consumers
who are unaware of the existence of an infomediary and obtain a price from just one retailer,
a proportion α2 of “partially informed” consumers who obtain a price from one retailer and
the referral infomediary (when it exists), and a proportion 1 − α1 − α2 of “fully informed”
consumers, who obtain prices from both retailers as well as the referral infomediary. When
the manufacturer has its own referral site, each of these three segments further subdivides
into two: a proportion β of consumers in each segment behave exactly as before, whereas
a proportion 1 − β obtains online prices via the manufacturer’s website. It is important to
note that in our model the uninformed segment is “uninformed” only about the competitive
prices, i.e. they do not search for more than one price because of high search costs. Hence
5

Firms like Autobytel.com and Carpoint.com charge an average fixed monthly fee of around $1,000
depending on dealer size and sales (Moon 2000).
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even online, the “uninformed” segment continues to search for one price. In comparison
the “ partially informed” and “fully informed” segments incur lower search costs and this
explains their multiple “price search” behavior.
When a consumer approaches a retailer for a price quote, the retailer is unable to distinguish which market segment a consumer belongs to. However, offline the retailer is able to
determine the consumer’s valuation for the product by virtue of the physical interaction as
described before.

3

Offline World: No Referral Services Exist

We now analyze each of the three scenarios mentioned, in turn, starting with the case of no
referral services. Each of the scenarios is described as a multi-stage game. We consider a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game in each case, and therefore analyze the game via
backward induction.
When neither the referral infomediary nor the manufacturer referral service exist, the
stages in the game are as follows:
Stage 1: The manufacturer sets the franchise fee, F .
Stage 2: Retailers simultaneously choose retail prices (P1 (VH ), P1 (VL )) and (P2 (VH ), P2 (VL )).
Stage 3: Consumers decide which product to buy.
Consider the three market segments:
(i) uninformed consumers, of market size α1 , observe just one offline price from one retailer.
We assume these consumers are equally likely to visit D1 and D2 .
(ii) partially informed consumers, of size α2 , behave in exactly the same way as uninformed
consumers when there is no infomediary. Hence, these consumers also visit D1 and D2 with
equal probability.
(iii) informed consumers, of size 1 − α1 − α2 , obtain prices from both retailers.
The prices observed by consumers in different market segments are depicted in Figure
1. In the offline world, the retailers perfectly observe each consumer’s valuation. Hence, the
prices offered to consumers depend on their valuations, as shown in the figure.
Since consumer valuations are observed offline, this basic model reduces to that of Varian
(1980). Using similar arguments, we can show that no pure-strategy equilibrium exists in the
subgame that starts at stage 2. There is, however, a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium
in which both retailers have equal market shares and offer randomly chosen prices to the
consumers. Retailers have monopoly power over those consumers who observe only one
price, providing an incentive to charge higher prices. However, retailers also aim to attract
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Figure 1: Prices observed by each consumer segment when no referral service exists
those customers who observe multiple prices, which in turn, offers an incentive to reduce
prices. The interplay of these two forces results in price dispersion. Let Gij (P ) denote the
probability that retailer j, where j = 1, 2, sets a price higher than P for consumer type V i ,
where i = L, H. For example, GL1 (P ) = Prob(P1 (VL ) ≥ P ) where P1 (VL ) is the price offered
by D1 to consumer type VL . Since the equilibrium we consider is symmetric, both dealers
adopt the same price distribution, Gi (P ), for each consumer type.
Lemma 1 There exists a symmetric equilibrium in which
(i) each retailer chooses a price for consumer type i, i = L, H, randomly from the interval
α1 +α2

[P̂i , Vi ], where P̂i = W +
(ii) Gi (P ) =

α1 +α2
2(1−α1 −α2 )

2−α1 −α
2
Vi −P
P −W

(Vi − W ),

, for P ∈ [P̂i , Vi ],

(iii) the expected profit of each retailer is E(π) =

α1 +α2
(λH VH
2

+ λ L VL − W ) −

δ
2

− F,

(iv) The expected price offered to consumers with valuation Vi , i = L, H, is
E(P (Vi )) = W +

(α1 +α2 )(ln

2−α1 −α2
α1 +α2

2(1−α1 −α2 )

)

(Vi − W ).

The proof of this and all other results is in the Appendix. The market share of each
retailer amongst consumers with valuation i is
E(Si ) =

Z

Vi
P̂i



α2 + α 1
dGi
1
+ (1 − α2 − α1 )Gi (P ) (−
)dP =
2
dP
2


Now, at stage 1, the manufacturer chooses the maximum franchise fee such that the retailers
earn a non-negative profit (else they will choose to not participate). Therefore, the optimal
franchise fee charged by the manufacturer is
F =

α1 + α 2
δ
(λH VH + λL VL − W ) −
2
2

. In equilibrium, retailers earn a zero profit. In accordance with prior literature (for example,
Rey and Stiglitz 1995, O’ Brien and Shaffer 1993), we assume the large manufacturer wields
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bargaining power over the small retailers, who earn a reservation profit of zero. 6 In later
sections, this implies that the manufacturer and infomediary capture all the gains from
increased channel profits. If the retailers also had some bargaining power, we would expect
them to share in such gains.

4

Model with Referral Infomediary

Next, we consider a model in which a referral infomediary enrols one retailer (specifically,
D2 ), and enables some consumers to obtain an online price from this retailer. There are now
four stages to the game:
Stage 1: The manufacturer sets the franchise fee, F .
Stage 2 : The referral infomediary enrols D2 , and sets a referral fee, K.
Stage 3: Retailers simultaneously choose prices. D1 chooses (P1 (VH ), P1 (VL )), as before, and
D2 chooses (P2 (VH ), P2 (VL )) for offline consumers, and P2r for online consumers (who access
the retailer via the referral infomediary).
Stage 4: Consumers decide which product to buy.
As before, uninformed consumers obtain just one offline price, and visit the two retailers
in equal proportion. Partially informed consumers obtain an offline price from D 1 , and an
online price from D2 . These consumers find it easier to search online, so choose to obtain an
online price, via the referral infomediary. Since this price comes from D2 , they visit D1 for
an offline price. Fully informed consumers obtain an offline price from each retailer, as well
as an online price from D2 . The prices observed by consumers in different market segments
are depicted in Figure 2. Note the difference with the model with no infomediary: offline
consumers still obtain a price that depends on type, but online consumers must receive a
price independent of type.
Retailers are now asymmetric in terms of the number of consumers who observe their
prices. This model, therefore, builds on Narasimhan (1988), who considers asymmetric
firms. Further, D2 can now quote more than one price to consumers in fully informed
segment, allowing for price discrimination across segments. This feature was pointed out by
Chen, Iyer, and Padmanabhan (2002). The model in this section is similar to theirs, with a
few important differences. We consider heterogenous consumer valuations, and a difference
between online and offline acquisition costs. Conversely, Chen et al. consider the impact of
changes in the reach of the infomediary, and also optimal contracts between the infomediary
6
If, retailers had
α1 +α2
(λH VH + λL VL
2

a positive reservation profit, R, the equilibrium franchise fee would be F =
− W ) − 2δ − R.
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Figure 2: Different prices observed by each consumer segment
and enrolled retailer.
Each retailer now has a captive segment of size
r

α1
2

while a proportion α2 of the population

r

see two prices, (P2 , P1 (VH )) or (P2 , P1 (VL )), depending upon their types Vi . In equilibrium,
D2 uses the infomediary as a price discriminating mechanism: it extracts full surplus from
all offline consumers (i.e., these consumers are just charged their valuations), and a lower
(random) price to online consumers. We make the following assumptions about the relative
proportion of high valuation consumers.
Assumption 1 (i) λH ≤

VL −W
VH −W

(ii) λH ≤

α1
.
2−α1

Intuitively, part (i) of the assumption ensures that there are fewer high value consumers
than low value consumers in the market, such that online the highest price a retailer will
charge is VL , the reservation price of low type consumers. If the proportion of high value
consumers is higher, online prices exceed VL , so that low type consumers may be shut out
of the online market. It is reasonable to assume that the retailer would want to sell to both
consumer types and this assumption captures that aspect. Part (ii) of the assumption, is
just a condition needed to have the price distribution GL1 (P ) > 0 as can be seen below.
Intuitively, this also ensures that the high value consumers do not constitute too large a
proportion of the market. In particular, notice that if α1 = 1, then this assumption implies
that the maximum value of λH = 12 . If this assumption fails to hold, then D1 charges VL
to low type consumers, and all partially and fully informed low type consumers buy via the
infomediary. Further details of the implications of relaxing these assumptions are discussed
in Section 7.
In equilibrium, offline high type consumers are charged VH . D2 , in fact, captures the
entire surplus from its captive uninformed segment, so that P2 (VH ) = VH and P2 (VL ) = VL .
The price quoted to the infomediary consumers, P2r is randomly chosen, and is used to
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compete against D1 in the informed segments.
Proposition 1 There exists an equilibrium in which P1 (VH ) = P2 (VH ) = VH and P2 (VL ) =
VL . The prices P1 (VL ) and P2r are randomly chosen from [P̂ ,VL ] where P̂ = W +
Further, Gr2 (P ) =

α1 (VL −P )
2(1−α1 )(P −W )

and GL1 (P ) =

α1 (VL −W )
λL (2−α1 )(P −W )

−

λH
λL

(VL −W )α1
.
(2−α1 )

, with a mass point at VL .

The entry of the referral infomediary leads to an increase in competition between the two
retailers. Essentially, D2 now has two weapons: it uses P2r to compete with D1 , and P2 (VH )
and P2 (VL ) to capture the entire consumer surplus from its captive uninformed segment. The
online infomediary referral price, P2r , is therefore used to discriminate between uninformed
and informed consumers. Since P2 (VL ) = VL and P2 (VH ) = VH , it is immediate that the
infomediary referral price is less than the offline price offered to consumers, regardless of their
valuation. This is consistent with the results of Chen et al. (2002). Further, Scott-Morton
and Zettelmeyer (2001) point out that the average customer of Autobytel pays approximately
2% less for her car which corresponds to about $450 of savings.
The heightened competition results in the lowering of the minimum price P̂ charged by
the retailers to the partially and fully informed segments, by an amount

2α2 (VL −W )
.
(2−α1 −α2 )(2−α1 )

As

the size of the partially informed segment α2 increases, this minimum price falls. This is
because, with the advent of the infomediary, the two firms compete more strongly for this
particular segment.
Given the equilibrium, we can now determine the sales and profit of each retailer. The
superscripts w and o on expected profits, E(πi ) denote the scenarios with and without
manufacturer referral services, for retailer i.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium,


α
α
1
1
− 21 < 12 < E(S2 ) = 1 − 2−α
− 21 ,
(i) the retailers’ expected sales are E(S1 ) = 2−α
1
1
(ii) the expected infomediary referral price and the expected price charged by D 1 to the low
type consumer are
E(P2r ) = W +

α1 (ln

2−α1
α1 )

(VL − W )

2(1 − α1 )
2−α

E(P1 (VL )) =

2α1 (1 − α1 )(ln α 1 )(VL − W )
(2 − α1 )(2λL + α1 (2 − λL ) − 2) λL VL + 4(1 − α1 )2 W
1
+
λL 2 (2 − α1 )2
λL 2 (2 − α1 )2

(iii) the expected profits are
α (1 − α1 )
α1
1
α
λH (VH − W ) + 1
(VL − W ) − (
− 1 )δ − F
2
2 − α1
2 − α1
2
α
α (1 − α1 )(VL − W ) α1
E(π2o ) = 1 (λH VH + λL VL − W ) + 1
−
δ − F − K.
2
2 − α1
2
E(π1o ) =
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In equilibrium D1 makes all its sales at its physical store. This includes a portion
made at VH to the high valuation consumers in the uninformed segment, a portion

λ H α1
2
λ L α1
2

made at P1 (VL ) to the low valuation consumers in the uninformed segment and a portion
1
( 2−α
−α1 )
1

λL

made at P1 (VL ) to the low valuation consumers in the partially and fully informed

segments. D2 makes some online sales, (1 −

1
),
2−α1

at the referral price, P2r , in the partially

and fully informed segments, and some sales at its physical store in the uninformed segment
(

λ H α1
2

and

λ L α1
,
2

respectively, to the high and low valuation consumers in this segment). Thus

the “reach” of the infomediary is equal 1 − α1 , the sum of the partially and fully informed
segments.
Sales made through the online referral mechanism incur no acquisition cost. However
for every customer who walks in at the physical stores, retailers incur an acquisition cost
of δ. The gross profit of D2 (i.e., without accounting for the franchise and referral fees) is
higher than that of D1 due to three reasons: (i) its total sales increase (i) its acquisition
costs decrease since some consumers shift online, and (iii) its ability to price discriminate
improves, and it can charge a monopoly price to the uninformed segment.
Note that the expected referral price, P2r , is independent of the probability of the valuations of consumers who request a quote, whereas the average walk-in prices depend on the
ratio of the low and high valuation consumers comprising the market. This is because, an
increase in λL implies a corresponding increase in the number of low valuation users in its
uninformed segment. It is now optimal for D1 to increase the offline price, so as to extract
more surplus from the captive uninformed segment.
In equilibrium, the manufacturer will set its franchise fee equal to the lower of the two
gross profits, that is, the expected gross profit of D1 . The optimal referral fee charged
by the infomediary will be the difference in profits between D2 and D1 . Compared to the
offline situation, D1 is now making fewer sales, at a smaller expected price for the low types.
Although the reduction in sales also implies lower acquisition costs, if it was profitable to
sell to the low types in the offline case, the gross profit of D1 (i.e., without subtracting off
the fixed franchise fee) must have decreased. Hence the franchise fee of the manufacturer
decreases with the entry of the infomediary.
Proposition 3 The optimal referral and franchise fees, respectively are
Fo =
Ko =

α1
λH (VH −
2
λL α1 (VL −W )
2

α1 (1−α1 )
2−α1
(1−α1 )2
δ.
2−α1

W) +
+

1
(VL − W ) − ( 2−α
−
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Thus the presence of the infomediary leads to an increase in the sales of the enrolled
retailer, and a corresponding decrease in the sales (and profit) of the other retailer. This, in
turn, leads to a lower franchise fee, and a decrease in the profits of the manufacturer. As a
response to this, the manufacturer establishes its own referral services. As we show, below
this strategic decision leads to an increase in the profits of the manufacturer.
Notice that with an increase in the acquisition costs, δ, there is an increase (decrease)
in the referral (franchise) fee. This is because as δ increases, the profit of the non-enrolled
retailer (which makes all its sales offline), decreases resulting in lower franchise fees for the
manufacturer. The profit of the enrolled retailer also decreases but by a lower amount
since it now makes fewer offline sales. The difference between the profits of the retailers
therefore increases, thereby leading to a higher referral fee for the infomediary. Thus, higher
acquisition costs are beneficial to the infomediary but detrimental to the manufacturer.

5

Manufacturer Establishes a Referral Service

Finally, we consider the scenario in which the manufacturer sets up its own referral websites,
in response the presence of the infomediary. This game is derived from the previous game
(which had only an infomediary; see Figure 2 above) as follows. We assume that, at each of
the four terminal nodes in Figure 2, a proportion β of the consumers continue to visit the
physical stores, while the remaining proportion, 1 − β, go to the corresponding retailer web
site (via a manufacturer referral).
The stages in this game are as follows:
Stage 1: The manufacturer sets the franchise fee, F , and establishes a referral web site.
Stage 2 : The referral infomediary enrols D2 , and sets a referral fee, K.
Stage 3: Retailers simultaneously choose prices. D1 chooses (P1 (VH ), P1 (VL )) for offline
consumers, and P1m for online consumers who come through the manufacturer web site. D2
chooses (P2 (VH ), P2 (VL )) for offline consumers, P2m for online consumers, who come via the
manufacturer web site, and P2r for online consumers who come via the referral infomediary.
Stage 4: Consumers decide which product to buy.
In terms of the stages, we allow the manufacturer to move first to capture the notion that
it has significant market power, and can establish its franchise fee to capture rents from the
dealers. The infomediary has less market power, and is, in a sense, the residual claimant on
the profit of D2 . The timing of the web site setup is not critical; we could alternatively have
a stage 2.5 above, at which the manufacturer sets up its web site. In equilibrium, this will
be anticipated by all players, and the fees set accordingly. The prices seen by consumers in
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different market segments are shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Different prices observed by each consumer segment
Each retailer continues to observe the type of the consumer at the physical store (i.e.,
in each of the four sub-segments of size β), and can quote a price to these consumers that
depends on their type. However, the retailers do not observe the types of the consumers
who come via the manufacturer web site. Hence, in the (1 − β) sub-segments, the same
prices must be quoted to both consumer types by a given retailer. We denote the online
(manufacturer referral) prices of the two retailers as P1m and P2m .
In equilibrium, the price offered by D2 to consumers who use the infomediary, P2r , follows
the same distribution as before, in Proposition 1, in the world with only an infomediary
and no manufacturer referrals. Consider the extreme case with only online consumers (i.e.,
β = 0). The structure of the game is then similar to the one with only an infomediary
referral service. However since all consumers here are online, no information about consumer
valuations is available. Since the proportion of high valuation consumers is low, both retailers
act as if all consumers had low valuations and set a highest price of VL , while randomizing
prices in the partially and fully informed segments. Hence Gr2 (P ) remains the same as in
Proposition 1.
This property then helps determine the rest of the equilibrium strategies. In particular,
given the structure of the new game, it implies that the prices P1 (VL ), P1 (VH ), P2 (VL ), P2 (VH )
are set as in the earlier game. Finally, P1m is chosen randomly over an interval as well. The
equilibrium exhibited below holds for all values of β ∈ [0, 1]. Note that, if β = 1, we are
back to the game of Figure 2, and the strategies shown below are equivalent to those in

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2003

13

Review of Marketing Science Working Papers, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 2

Proposition 1 (since Gm
(P ) is not relevant when β = 1).
1
Proposition 4 There exists an equilibrium in which:
(i) P1 (VL ), P1 (VH ), P2 (VL ), P2 (VH ) and P2r are set exactly as in Proposition 1,
(ii) P2m = VL , and P1m is randomly chosen over [P̂ , VL ], where P̂ = W +
Gm
(P ) =
1

α1 (VL −W )
.
(2−α1 )(P −W )

α1 (VL −W )
.
(2−α1 )

Further,

The market shares of the two retailers remain the same as in the world with an infomediary, but no manufacturer referrals. Further, the expected infomediary referral price of D 2
is lower than its walk-in prices P2 (VH ), P2 (VL ) or the manufacturer referral price P2m . There
are two countervailing effects here. First, there is the price discrimination aspect: P 2r is
used as a competitive tool against D1 . Second, there is a loss of information about consumer
willingness to pay on the Internet. This prevents the retailer from practising online price discrimination based on consumer valuations. These two effects act in tandem with each other
and bring down the infomediary referral prices. However retailers also gain from the fact
that there is a potential savings in the acquisition cost per online customer. In equilibrium,
the gross profits of D1 increase, allowing for a higher franchise fee.
Proposition 5 In equilibrium,
(i) the retailers’ expected sales are E(S1 ) =
(ii) The expected prices are:
E(P1m ) =
r

1
2−α1

−

α1
,
2

E(S2 ) = 1 −

4W (1 − α1 )2 + α1 (2 − α1 )VL + 2α1 (1 − α1 ) (ln

E(P2 ) = W +



1
2−α1

2−α1
α1 )

−

α1
2



.

(VL − W )

(2 − α1 )2
α1 (ln

2−α1
α1 )

(VL − W )

2(1 − α1 )

(iii) The expected profits are
α1 (1 − α1 ) (VL − W )
− F)
(2 − α1 )
α (4 − 3α1 )(VL − W )
E(π2m ) = βE(π2o ) + (1 − β)( 1
− F − K)
2(2 − α1 )

E(π1m ) = βE(π1o ) + (1 − β)(

We observe that the expected price E(P2r ) increases with the size of the captive segment
α1 (the increase is close to linear for higher values of α1 ). An increase in the size of the captive
segment α1 implies a decrease in the reach of the referral service (there are fewer consumers
in the partially and fully informed segments, the segments that use the infomediary). This
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increase in the captive uninformed segment of D1 provides it an incentive to increase its
online price, P1m . Now, D2 can utilize this fact to its advantage by increasing its infomediary
referral price, P2r . It is still able to compete successfully with D1 in the partially and fully
informed segments, thus increasing its profit. After the manufacturer adopts its own referral
service, D2 still retains an advantage over D1 , both in terms of expected sales and gross
profits (recall that these are the profits before the franchise fee and infomediary fee are
subtracted out). Notice that when α1 = 1, E(P1m ) and E(P1 (VL )) are both equal to VL .
If all consumers are uninformed, then the retailers can charge monopoly prices to these
captive consumers. We state the following corollary without proof (a proof is immediate by
comparing the quantities in Propositions 2 and 5).
Corollary 5.1 In equilibrium, with or without the introduction of the manufacturer referral
service, the retailer associated with the infomediary, D2 , has higher expected sales and gross
profits. Further, the sales of each retailer remain the same after the introduction of the
manufacturer referral service.
Comparing the performance of D2 when it enrolls with the infomediary to its performance
in the offline world, we see that it experiences a significant gain in market share, from
(1 −

1
2−α1

+

α1
).
2

1
2

to

Hence, there is a strong incentive for D2 (or more generally, for any one

retailer) to enrol with the infomediary. An affiliation with the referral infomediary provides
the retailer with the ability to price discriminate in its uninformed (captive) segment. It
charges a monopoly price to all offline consumers, and uses the referral price to compete
with the other retailer online. This increases its expected sales. Conversely, the retailer who
remains out of the infomediary referral services incurs a significant loss in expected sales and
profits. This highlights the “demand reallocation” mechanism of the referral service.
Recall that GL1 (P ) has a positive mass at VL , whereas Gm
(P ) does not. Further, we can
1
write GL1 (P ) =

1
(Gm
(P )−λH ).
1
λL

Thus, for low values of P , GL1 (P ) < Gm
(P ), resulting higher
1

sales by D1 . Conversely, for high values of P (including VL ), GL1 (P ) > Gm
(P ), resulting in
1
lower sales by D1 . These two effects exactly offset each other, so that the expected sales of
each retailer remain the same irrespective of manufacturer referral services.
Notice that Gm
(P ) reduces to GL1 (P ) when λL = 1, and λH = 0. Even when λL < 1,
1
since neither retailer wants to shut out the low valuation buyers, the anonymity provided by
the Internet leads to both retailers charging no more than VL to all online consumers. This
is equivalent to assuming that all consumers have a low valuation. Therefore, G r2 (P ) follows
the same distribution, we get the result that expected sales remain the same even with the
entry of the manufacturer referral service.
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In equilibrium, the manufacturer again sets the franchise fee, F , so that the retailer with
lower sales, D1 , makes a zero profit. The infomediary then sets its fee, K, to capture the
remaining profit of D2 . Further, we show that if the offline acquisition cost, δ, is large enough,
the manufacturer makes a higher profit when it offers its own referral web site. Define this
critical value, δc , as follows:
δc =
Consider the term
informed segment

λH α1 (2 − α1 )
(VH − W )
2 − α1 (2 − α1 )

α1 (2−α1 )
. This is just the
2−α1 (2−α1 )
α1
( 2 ) to its total sales E(S1 ).

ratio of the sales of D1 in its captive unThe remainder of δc , λH (VH − W ) is the

maximum margin from a high valuation consumer, weighted by the proportion of high valuation consumers in the market. This second term reflects the opportunity cost of online
sales: The retailer loses information on consumer valuation. We show that, in equilibrium,
total surplus in the channel increases when δ exceeds this critical value, δc . In particular, the
manufacturer’s profit increases, since the manufacturer extracts some of the higher channel
surplus via the franchise fee. Further, consumer surplus also increases. The effects on the
infomediary profit are discussed below.
Note that if λH = 0, i.e., if all consumers were homogeneous in their valuations then
the critical value is δc = 0. This implies that for any positive value of acquisition costs,
manufacturers would benefit from establishing referral services. This is natural since the
only benefit offered by the higher offline acquisition costs is that consumer valuations are determined exactly in the costly interaction process. In a world with homogeneous consumers,
this benefit ceases to exist.
A lack of heterogeneity in consumer valuations leads to lower franchise fees for the manufacturer, but a higher referral fee for the infomediary. This is because E(π 1m ) decreases,
while E(π2m ) increases as λH tends to zero. The infomediary helps D2 in price discriminating
across market segments and squeezing out the surplus from the low valuation consumers
in its captive (uninformed) segment. When the proportion of high valuation consumers increases, both retailers make more profits because the size of the captive segment to whom
they could charge VH increases. However, this also implies that there are fewer low valuation captive consumers from whom D2 can extract more surplus, reducing the difference in
profits between the retailers. Higher profits for D1 translate into higher franchise fees for
the manufacturer, while the smaller difference in profits results in lower referral fees for the
infomediary. Thus increasing consumer heterogeneity is beneficial for the manufacturer but
detrimental for the infomediary.
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Proposition 6 (i) The optimal franchise and referral fees, respectively, are
α1
α
1
λH (VH − W ) − ( 2−α
− 21 )δ
2
1
α1 (1−λH β)
(1−α )2 β
(VL − W ) + (2−α1 ) δ.
2
1

Fm = β
Km =





+

α1 (1−α1 )
2−α1

(VL − W ),

(ii) If δ ≥ δc , the manufacturer earns a higher profit by opening up its own referral web site.
(iii) Consumer surplus increases with the establishment of the manufacturer referral service.

Consider the effects of the manufacturer referral service on the infomediary profit. The
profit of the infomediary in this last case can be written as K m = βK o +(1−β)

α1
2

(VL −W ).

Notice first that this is always positive, for any value of δ. Secondly, when β = 1, this is
exactly equal to K o . As β decreases to zero (i.e., more consumers shop online), K m decreases
when δ is large enough (in particular, δ ≥

(2−α1 )α1 λH (VL −W )
).
2(1−α1 )2

Conversely, if δ is small, the

infomediary profit increases as β decreases.
Hence, when δ is large enough, there is a reallocation of channel profits from the referral
infomediary to the manufacturer, after the manufacturer introduces its own referral service.
The impetus toward an increased manufacturer profit comes from a reduction in acquisition
costs for the online segment of the market. This increases profit in the channel, and enables
the manufacturer to extract this increased profit via an increase in the franchise fee that
it charges the retailers. Since eventual profits of each retailer are non-negative, there is
no conflict of interest here between channel members. Thus the strategic decision by the
manufacturer to adopt an online referral service affects both channel profits achievable and
the allocation of profits among channel members.
In our model, we consider acquisition costs only on the final sales made to the customers.
One might argue that acquisition costs are incurred not on the final sales, but rather on all
prospective customers who walk in to the physical store. Consider the effects of this on our
model. Since the number of consumers who obtain offline prices falls after the manufacturer
referral site is established, the total acquisition cost will still fall. This reduction in cost,
in turn, represents an increase in channel profit that the manufacturer can then extract,
preserving the qualitative features of the model.

5.1

Closing Ratios of Referral Services

In equilibrium, the number of online quotes provided to consumers exceeds the total number
of sales via online referrals. A referral is not costless, since responding to an online request
entails an investment in time for a retailer. A standard measure of sales efficiency in this
Number of units sold
context is the Closing Ratio (CR), defined as follows: CR = Number
of referrals received .
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This ratio is similar to the “Coverage Efficiency” ratio mentioned by Balasubramaniam
(1998) in a paper on competition between retailers and a direct marketer.
A low closing ratio would imply an inability to convert referrals into sales, further suggesting high costs and low profits. This statistic also forms a pivotal basis on which a retailer
is evaluated by the referral infomediary, thereby ensuring the viability of the referral institution. In particular, a low closing ratio implies low consumer satisfaction, and may lead to
the retailer being dropped by the infomediary. For example, in 1998-99, Autobytel dropped
around 250 dealers (10% of its dealer base) because of negative customer feedback and low
closing ratios (see Moon, 2000).
Table 1 below shows the closing ratio for the different price quotes offered by retailers.
Comparing the online closing ratios for the retailers, we find that D2 has a higher closing
ratio for infomediary referrals than D1 for manufacturer referrals. This reflects the ability
of D2 to price discriminate online as well, since this retailer obtains referrals via both the
manufacturer and the infomediary.
Price Quote
D1 manufacturer referral
D2 manufacturer referral

Expected Sales Number of Referrals
α
α
1
− 21
1 − 21
2−α1
α
α1
1 − 21 − α2
2

D2 infomediary referral

1−α1
2−α1

(1 − α1 )

Closing ratio
(1−α1 )2 +1
(2−α1 )2
α1
2−α1 −2α2
1
2−α1

Secondly, for D2 , the closing ratio from manufacturer referrals can be higher than the
ratio from infomediary referrals. In particular, if the size of the partially informed market
segment (which has mass α2 ) is large, the fully informed segment decreases. A proportion
(1 − β) of the latter segment obtains a quote from D2 via a manufacturer referral. The
size of the uninformed segment (which represents a closing ratio of 1) remains the same.
Hence, a decrease in the fully informed segment leads to an overall increase in efficiency for
manufacturer referrals to D2 . Conversely, if the partially informed segment is small, D2 has
a higher closing ratio for infomediary referrals.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, on the whole, auto dealers have higher closing ratios
than infomediaries.7 For example, GM, has one of the highest closing ratios in the referral
business, greater than 20% while Microsoft CarPoint and AutoWeb have a CR of between
12% and 19 %. However, Carsdirect.com has a higher closing ratio than any other service,
including the OEMs. These comparisons are summarized in the next Proposition.
Proposition 7 The equilibrium closing ratios satisfy the following properties:
7

“Car Dealers Fumbling Web Potential,” www.ECommerceTimes.com, 06/21/01.
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r

m

(i) CR2 > CR1 : the closing ratio for D2 for sales via the infomediary exceeds the closing
ratio of D1 via the manufacturer referral site.
(ii) If α2 ≥

(1−α1 )(2−α1 )
,
2

then CR2

m

r

> CR2 : if the partially informed segment is large

enough, the closing ratio of D2 via the manufacturer referral site exceeds its closing ratio via
the infomediary.
We also compare the conversion ratios for the offline consumers between the two retailers.
For a reasonably wide range of α1 , α2 we find that D2 has a better conversion ratio than
D1 . Since D2 is pricing at the monopoly price for the low valuation consumers, one would
expect it to have been the other way around. The intuition behind this result is the fact even
though D1 is randomizing P1 (VL ) between P̂ and VL , it is competing head to head with P2r
over the whole range of the 1 − α1 segment consisting of the partially and the fully informed
consumers, who all get to see the infomediary referral price. Hence even though P 1 (VL ) is on
an average lower than P2 (VL ), there are more people getting to observe P1 (VL ) than P2 (VL ).
The two competing factors result in a higher overall closing ratio of D2 than that of D1 .

5.2

Empirical Evidence

We show in this subsection that, over a wide range of parameters, our model generates
propositions are empirically operationalizable. We discuss the parameter values used in this
corroboration, followed by their implications for δc , K, and closing ratios.
First, consider the sizes of the different market segments. Klein and Ford (2001) point
out in their sample of Internet auto buyers that about 58% of consumers do not search at
all. Additionally, about 22% of the buyers, exhibit moderate search behavior by searching
some of the offline and online sources while about 20% are highly active information seekers
who obtain multiple quotes from all possible sources. This sort of consumer search behavior
is corroborated by a J.D.Powers study, which finds that about 41% of consumers surveyed
used a referral service while buying a car, whereas the remaining 59% did not.8 Based on
these data sources, we vary the value of α1 , the size of the uninformed segment in our model,
from zero to 0.5. Further, Ratchford, Lee and Talukdar (2002) find that 40% of buyers used
online sources (i.e., manufacturer and third-party websites). Based on this we vary the β
from 0.5 to 1.
On acquisition costs, Scott-Morton, Zettelmeyer and Risso (2001) show that the between
the average cost to a dealer of an offline sale ($1,575) is $675 higher than the cost to a sale
via Autobytel ($900). They further mention a NADA study, which shows that a dealer’s
8

“Microsoft CarPoint,” HBS Case study, August 2000.
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average new car sales personnel and marketing costs ($1,275) are reduced by $1,000 by virtue
of sales through Internet referral services. We vary the proportion of high valuation buyers,
λH , from zero to 0.4. Based on actual average gross margin of dealers (see Moon, 2000), we
take (VH − W ) to be 3000 and (VL − W ) to be 1500.
Using these ranges for the parameters, we compute δc , the critical value of the acquisition
cost, K, the infomediary referral fee, and closing ratios. We choose α1 ∈ [0, 0.5], and,
for each α1 , the maximal permissible value of λH under Assumption 1. Figure 4 below
demonstrates the critical value, δc . If the actual acquisition cost, δ, lies above the line, the
manufacturer’s profit increases after it establishes its own referral service. As seen from
the figure, the maximal δc over this parameter range is $700, close to the lower bound of
empirically observed difference between offline and online acquisition costs ($675–$1,000).
700
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Figure 4: Critical Acquisition Costs, δc
Next, consider price differences between offline and online channels.

Scott-Morton,

Zettelmeyer and Risso (2001) show that the average Autobytel customer sees a contract
price about $800 less than the non-referral offline prices. For the parameters we consider,
the difference between the expected low valuation offline and the expected online infomediary
referral price quotes (for D2 , the retailer associated with the infomediary), ranges between
$900 and $1500.
Finally, we numerically estimate the closing ratios of the referral services. We find that
the CR of D2 via manufacturer referral services ranges between 10% and 30%, and is similar
to the closing ratio for offline sales. According to anecdotal evidence, Forddirect.com has a
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CR of 17% and GMBuypower.com has a CR of greater than 20%.9 Between May through
October, 2001 GM tested a system of providing sales leads or referrals to Chevrolet dealers
in the Washington, D.C., area. According to GM, about 25% of such referrals were closed,
which was roughly the same proportion as that of walk-in leads closed through physical
showrooms. The numerical parameterization, therefore, highlights the robustness of the
model and the main results.
The CR from the infomediary referral price in our model is 50−66%, higher than industry
evidence.10 One reason for this may be that we do not consider inter-brand competition in
our model. If consumers search amongst multiple brands before completing a purchase, there
will be multiple referrals for a single sale, thereby resulting in lower closing ratios.

6

Business Implications

We present a model with multiple consumer types, multiple information structures and
multiple channels. Our analysis suggests that manufacturers who cannot directly sell to
consumers for some reason can still gain from adopting an online referral model. In particular,
diverting traffic from offline to online channels leads to a reduction in retailers’ acquisition
costs, and increases the channel profits. This happens despite retailers having to forgo
information about consumer types online, though this information can be acquired offline.
That is, selling online results in the loss of the ability to distinguish between the high and
the low valuation customers. On the other hand, acquisition costs borne by dealers are much
lower for online customers. This critical tradeoff, between higher information offline versus
lower acquisition costs online, determines the equilibrium results.
We find that Internet referral services have the potential to solve customer, retailer
and manufacturer problems. On the demand side, the referral services help consumers to
costlessly get an additional retail price quote before purchase. On the firm side, a referral
mechanism endows enrolled retailers with a tool to practice price discrimination (between
online and walk-in customers) and enable a significant reduction of their acquisition costs.
The strategic decision by the manufacturer to invest in the online referral marketplace,
therefore, increases the overall profits in the channel. The extent to which overall profits
increase depend on the relative composition of consumer types in the market and their
valuations. While, in our model, the manufacturer captures this increase, we expect the
actual allocation of profits among channel members to vary, depending on the bargaining
9
10

www.trilogy.com/Sections/Industries/Automotive/Customers/FordDirect -Success-Story.cfm
http://www.investorville.com/ubb/Forum2/HTML/000040.html
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power of each agent. Since each retailer accrues an increase in gross profits, there need not
be a conflict of interest between channel members.
In the presence of intra-brand competition, some of the increased profit from diverting
traffic online may be used to provide higher service levels offline. If, for example, there is
self-selection into online versus offline channels, the consumers who stay offline may be more
service conscious. This creates an incentive to provide high levels of end-to-end service by
dealers, and has recently been an important issue with auto manufacturers. Since service
satisfaction often translates to repeat sales in the future, online manufacturer referrals can
be a significant tool to ensure increased profits by maximizing a “customer’s life time value.”

7

Conclusion and Extensions

In today’s environment of IT-intensive marketing, the Internet is dramatically changing
traditional channels of sales and distribution. New players enter and existing structures
and roles change, leaving traditional players struggling to decide which strategy to pursue.
The auto industry, for example, has witnessed some restructuring of business models, such
that manufacturers can gain a stronger toehold in the distribution chain instead of allowing
third-party intermediaries to dictate terms. Using a game-theoretic model, we investigate the
competitive implications of these newly emerging technology-based institutions on retailer
prices and their impact on channel structures and profits. We show that channel profits are
a function of acquisition costs, heterogeneity in consumer valuations and search behavior,
retailers’ inter-channel price discrimination opportunities and the reach of referral services.
Referral services are becoming increasingly popular and this paper is an attempt at
understanding such business models and their implications. It is important to note that,
although our analysis is conducted in the context of a simple model, many of our assumptions
can be relaxed without altering the nature of our conclusions. For example, the model can
be extended to the case in which the informed segment decide to get both prices from the
same retailer: its infomediary referral price and the manufacturer referral price or walk-in
price. Second, we could allow for a possibility of bargaining or sequential search behavior
amongst consumers. This feature of consumer behavior however brings in multiple equilibria
into existence. In this case, either a Bertrand equilibrium results, with both retailers pricing
at marginal cost, or if retailers adopt a price-matching guarantee, they can sustain a collusive
outcome with prices equal to VL .
Finally, we do not allow the manufacturer to choose a wholesale price W to implicitly
factor in the fact that in the real world, extensive inter-manufacturer competition will debar
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firms from changing the wholesale price by large amounts. In our model, if the wholesale
price, W , is also chosen by the manufacturer, the equilibrium in the offline case would have
the manufacturer fixing W = VL . In such a scenario, both retailers would randomize the
prices for the high valuation customers, charging the low valuation customers exactly V L .
A logical extension would be to examine inter-brand competition with two manufacturers
in the given set up. The equilibrium solutions with two manufacturers become quite complicated. Nonetheless we provide some intuition as to what may happen. In our model the
manufacturer enjoys a very high bargaining power due to the absence of inter-brand competition. This makes the retailers thrive with a non-zero reservation profit, thereby facilitating
the siphoning of the entire surplus by the manufacturer. However if there is one more manufacturer, the increased competition between manufacturers would then lead to both retailers
garnering some of the increased channel profits, due to the enhanced bargaining power arising
from the threat of defection by the retailers.11

11

We are grateful to Kannan Srinivasan, Ajay Kalra, Anthony Dukes, Philipp Afeche, seminar participants
at Carnegie Mellon University, participants at CIST-INFORMS 2002 and WISE 2002 and the Editor and
an anonymous reviewer at ROMS, for helpful comments. All errors remain our own responsibility.
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8

Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1
We present a constructive proof of the equilibrium. Suppose there is a symmetric equilibrium, so that both retailers use the same strategy. We construct this strategy, and then
show it satisfies the required properties of an equilibrium.
First, note that each retailer observes the type of each consumer, and hence charges a
price contingent on this type. Suppose a retailer ignores the competitive segment of the
market (that has mass (1 − γ)), and charges a monopoly price, Pim , to its captive segment
of type i (i = L, H). Then, it is clear that Pim = Vi . Choosing Pim < Vi does not increase
demand in the captive segment, so yields lower profit.
Suppose, for each retailer, Pim (i = L, H) is randomly chosen over [P̂i , Pim ]. Then, its
profit from consumer type i at any price in this interval must be the same, and must equal
the profit at price Pim . Suppose the mixed strategy has no mass points (we will show
later that the distribution we derive satisfies this property). Define γ =
1 − α1 − α2 = 1 − 2γ). Then, at the price

Pim ,

α1 +α2
2

(so that

a retailer sells only to its captive segment,

and its profit from consumer type i is λi γ (Vi − W ).
At some price P in the support of its mixed strategy, a retailer sells to its captive segment,
and also captures Gi (P ) of the competitive segment (since the equilibrium is symmetric).
Hence, its profit from consumer type i is λi (γ + Gi (P )(1 − 2γ)) (P − W ). This profit
must equal the profit from charging Pim , if the retailer randomizes over P and Pim . Hence,
(γ + Gi (P )(1 − 2γ)) (P − W ) = γ (Vi − W ). This implies Gi (P ) =
γ
1−2γ

=

α1 +α2
,
2(1−α1 −α2 )

γ
1−2γ

−P
( PVi−W
). Noting that

we have the form of Gi (P ) in the statement of the Lemma.

Now, the lower bound on the support of the mixed strategy is found by setting G i (P̂i ) = 1.
This yields
P̂i =

1 − 2γ
γ
W+
Vi
1−γ
1−γ

Substituting for γ, we have
P̂i =

α1 + α 2
2(1 − α1 − α2 )
W+
Vi
2 − α1 − α2
2 − α1 − α2

Finally, we show that this is an equilibrium. Note that Gi (P m ) = 0, so the mixed strategy
has no mass points. Consider retailer 1. For all prices P ∈ [P̂i , Pim ], retailer 1 earns the same
profit from consumer type i (by construction). If it charges P > Pim , it loses all consumers
of type i, leading to a lower profit. If it charges P < P̂i , it captures the same market share
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as at P̂i , (1 −

α1 +α2
),
2

at a lower price. Hence, it makes a lower profit than at P̂i . Therefore,

retailer 1 has no profitable deviation. By symmetry, neither does retailer 2. Hence, the
strategies postulated constitute an equilibrium.
i
. Note that the market share of each retailer is
Let gi = − dG
dP

− 2δ ,

for each retailer, the consumer acquisition cost is

1
2

(by symmetry). Hence,

and the franchise fee is F . Then, the

expected profits of each retailer are
π = λL
λH

Z

VH
P̂H



Z

VL
P̂L



α1 + α 2
+ (1 − α1 − α2 )GL (P )
2



(P − W ) gL (P )dP +

α1 + α 2
+ (1 − α1 − α2 )GH (P ) (P − W ) gH (P ) dP −
2
α + α2
(λH VH + λL VL − W ) −
= 1
2


δ
−F
2
δ
−F
2

The expected price faced by consumer type i, E(P (Vi )), is given by

Z

Vi
P̂i

P dgi = W +

(α1 + α2 )(ln

2−α1 −α2
)
α1 +α2

2(1 − α1 − α2 )

(Vi − W )

Proof of Proposition 1
(i) As in Lemma 1, we first derive the mixed strategies for the players and then demonstrate
that these constitute an equilibrium. Consider P1 (VL ), the price charged by D1 to the
low consumer type. In equilibrium, D1 should make the same profit by charging any price
P in the support of the mixed strategy as from charging a monopoly price VL . Hence,
α1
(P
2

− W ) + (1 − α1 − α2 + α2 )(P − W )Gr2 (P ) − F =
Gr2 (P ) =

α1
(VL
2

− W ) − F , which implies

α1 (VL − P )
2(1 − α1 )(P − W )

Setting Gr2 (P ) = 1 yields the lower bound, of the support of the equilibrium strategy,
P̂ =

(VL −W )α1
2−α1

+ W . Note that this lower bound, P̂ , must be the same for each firm. Suppose

P̂1 < P̂2 . Then, by charging P̂1 +  (for some  ∈ (0, P̂2 − P̂1 )), D1 earns a higher profit than
from any price P ∈ (P̂1 , P̂1 + ). Hence, it cannot be an equilibrium to have P̂1 < P̂2 . By
the same logic, it cannot be that P̂2 < P̂1 , so it must be that P̂1 = P̂2 = P̂ .
Now, for D2 , the profit from any price P in the support of its mixed strategy P2r should
be equal to that from charging the lower bound P̂ . First, note that, given assumption 1 (i),
the highest that P2r will be set to is VL .12 Further, in equilibrium P1 (VH ) = VH . Hence, all
12

Since (λH + λL )VL ≥ λH VH , charging any price in the region (VL , VH ] leads to lower profit, since no
lower valuation consumers will buy at such a price.
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consumers of type VH who observe P2r will buy at the latter price. Therefore,
λH (1 − α1 )(P2r − W ) + λL (1 − α1 )(P2r − W )GL1 (P ) = (λH + λL )(1 − α1 )(P̂ − W )
which implies
GL1 (P ) =

λ
(P̂ − W )
− H
λL (P − W ) λL

(ii) Next, we prove that the conjectured strategies constitute an equilibrium. By construction, GL1 (P ) and Gr2 (P ) are best responses. Hence, neither retailer can gain by charging any
other price P1 (VL ) and P2r . Now, suppose firm 1 sets P1 (VH ) < VH . Since, at any price in the
region [VL , VH ], it obtains the same sales amongst high value consumers as at VH , this prices
lead to lower profits, and will not be chosen. Suppose it chooses a price P1 (VH ) = P < VL .
Then, compared to charging P1 (VH ) = VH , in its own captive segment it loses an amount
λH

α1
2

(VH − P ). In the other two segments, it wins over some sales from D2 . Specifically, in

these segments, it gains λH (1 − α1 )Gr2 (P )(P − W ). To sustain the equilibrium, we require
the net gain to be non-positive. Substituting Gr2 (P ) =

α1 (VL −P )
,
2(1−α1 )(P −W )

this implies VL ≤ VH ,

which is true by assumption. Hence, no deviation from P1 (VH ) = VH is profitable.
Next we show that P2 (VH ) = VH . At any price P ∈ [VL , VH ], D2 sells only to its own
captive segment,

α1
,
2

of the high type consumer. Since sales are unchanged at all these prices,

VH is optimal in this set.
Now, consider D2 charging a price P̃ < VL to the high type consumers. Compared to
setting P2 (VH ) = VL , in its captive segment it loses λH

α1
2

(VH − P̃ ). In the non-captive

segments (of total mass (1 − α1 )), it is already capturing the entire market for the high
types, since max P2r = VL < P1 (VH ) = VH . Hence, it merely cannibalizes its own sales in
this segment, for an additional loss of λH (1 − α1 ) Gr2 (P ) (VL − P ). Therefore, this is not a
profitable deviation.
Finally we show that it is not optimal for D2 to set P2 (VL ) < VL . Suppose it does charge
P2 (VL ) < VL . There are three effects on profit, compared to charging P2 (VL ) = VL :
(a) in its captive segment, it loses λL

α1
2

(VL − P2 (VL )),

(b) in the segment of mass (1 − α1 − α2 ), if P < P2r < VL , it cannibalizes its own sales, and
loses an amount λL (1 − α1 − α2 ) GL1 (P ) Ge2 (P ) Prob(P2r < P1 (VL ) | P2r > P ) {E(P2r | P <
P2r < P1 (VL )) − P2 (VL )}, where E(P2r | P < P2r < P1 (VL )) is the expected price at which the
cannibalized sales were being made (the conditioning event is that P < P2r < P1 (VL )).
(c) finally, in the segment of mass (1 − α1 − α2 ), if P < VL < P2r , it wins some sales
over from D1 , leading to a gain λL (1 − α1 − α2 ) GL1 (P ) Ge2 (P ) Prob(P1 (VL ) < P2r | P <
P1 (VL )) (P − W ).
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Replacing the relevant expressions for GL1 (P ) and Gr2 (P ), and evaluating the conditional
probabilities and expectations, we find that, in overall terms, the firm loses some profit. 13
Hence, it will not deviate to P2 (VH ) < VL . Since neither retailers has a profitable deviation,
the specified strategies constitute an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
i
. Retailer D1 sells to all of its captive segment, of size
(i) As before, let gi = − dG
dP

α1
.
2
r

In other

two segments, of size (1−α1 ), it sells only to the low consumer type, and only if P2 > P1 (VL ),
which happens with probability Gr2 (P ) for any price P in the support of GL1 (P ). Therefore,
the expected sales of D1 are given by
E(S1 ) =

Z Pm
α1
1
α
(1 − α1 ) Gr2 (P ) g1L (P )dP =
− 1.
+ λL
2
2 − α1
2
P̂

(1)

Similarly, we can derive the expected sales of retailer D2 as
Z Pm
α
α1
1
− 1
+ λL
E(S2 ) =
(1 − α1 ) GL1 (P ) g2e (P )dP + λH (1 − α1 ) = 1 −
2
2 − α1
2
P̂

!

(2)

As expected, the retailers’ total sales sum to 1.
Finally, we show that E(S1 ) <

1
2

< E(S2 ). This will be true as long as E(S1 ) < E(S2 ),

since E(S1 ) + E(S2 ) = 1. Now, E(S1 ) < E(S2 ) if and only if
1−

1
1
α
α
+ 1 >
− 1
2 − α1
2
2 − α1
2

⇐⇒

1>

α1 (ln

2−α1
)
α1

2
− α1 ,
2 − α1

or, α1 2 − α1 < 0, which is true since 0 < α1 < 1.
(ii) The expected infomediary referral price is
r

E(P2 ) =

Z

Pm

P
P̂

g2e (P )dP

=W+

(VL − W )

2(1 − α1 )

and the expected price charged by D1 to the low consumer type is
E(P1 (VL )) = (1 − GL1 (P m ))

Z

Pm
P̂

P g1L (P )dP + GL1 (P m )P m

Here, we account for the mass point (of mass GL1 (P m )) at P m = VL . Carrying out the
integration for these last two equations yields the statements in the proposition.
13

For brevity, algebraic details that do not provide insight into the model are omitted here and in a few
other places of the appendix, and are available from the authors on request.
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(iii) Similarly, the expected profit of retailer D1 , E(π1o ), is
λL

Z

Pm
P̂



!

1
α
α
− 1 δ−F
(P − W )
dP + λH 1 (VH − W ) −
2
2 − α1
2
!
α1
α1 (1 − α1 )
α1
1
=
δ − F,
λ (VH − W ) +
(VL − W ) −
−
2 H
2 − α1
2 − α1
2

α1
+ (1 − α1 )Gr2 (P )
2



g1L (P )

and the expected profit of retailer D2 is
E(π2o ) =
=

α1
(λH VH
2

α1
(λH VH
2

+

R Pm

L
e
P̂ (1 − α1 ) G1 (P ) (P − W )g2 (P )dP
R m
α
λH (1 − α1 ) P̂P (P − W )g2e (P )dP − 21 δ − F − K
α (1−α1 ) (VL −W )
α
λL VL − W ) + 1 2−α
− 21 δ − F − K.
1

+ λ L VL − W ) + λ L

+

Proof of Proposition 3
The manufacturer optimally maximizes its franchise fee, subject to the condition that
both dealers must earn a non-negative expected profit (else they will exit the market). Let π̃ i
be the gross profits of retailer i (that is, without subtracting off the franchise or infomediary
fees). Then, in equilibrium,
F ∗ = min{E(π̃1 ), E(π̃2 )} =

α1
α1
1
α
λH (VH − W ) +
(VL − W )(1 − α1 ) − (
− 1 )δ.
2
2 − α1
2 − α1
2

Now, the infomediary sets the maximum referral fee at which D2 earns a non-negative profit.
This is defined by the K ∗ at which E(π̃2 ) − F ∗ − K ∗ = 0, or
K ∗ = E(π̃2 ) − F ∗ =

λL α1 (VL − W ) (1 − α1 )2
+
δ.
2
2 − α1

Note that K ∗ > 0 (since both terms are positive), which confirms that E(π̃1 ) < E(π̃2 ).
Proof of Proposition 4
We proceed with a series of steps.
Step 1 First, suppose β = 0, so that there are no consumers at the physical stores. We
derive the equilibrium strategies for this case, and show that Gr2 (P ) is the same as in the
world with only an infomediary.
From the profit invariance condition of a mixed strategy equilibrium, D1 should make the
same profit from any price P in the support of its mixed strategy as it would at a monopoly
price. Since D1 cannot differentiate across consumer types when β = 1, it must be the case
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that its monopoly price is P m = VL (as shown in Proposition 1, this yields a higher profit
than VH ). Hence,
(λL + λH )

α
α1
(P − W ) + (1 − α1 )(P − W )Gr2 (P ) − F = (λL + λH ) 1 (P m − W ) − F
2
2

and
Gr2 (P ) =

α1 (VL − P )
2(1 − α1 )(P − W )

Therefore, the distribution of P2r , Gr2 (P ), is identical to that in Proposition 1. This further
yields that P̂ =

α1 (VL −W )
2−α1

+ W , as before. Similarly for D2 , profit from pricing at any

P ∈ [P̂ , VL ] should be the same as the profit from pricing at P̂ . Hence,
α1 m
(λL + λH )
(P2 − W ) + (1 − α1 ) Gm
(P ) (P − W ) − K =
1
2


α1 m
w
(P − W ) + (1 − α1 ) G1 (P̂ ) (P̂ − W )+ − K
(λL + λH )
2 2




which implies
Gm
(P ) =
1

α1 (VL − W )
(P̂ − W )
=
r
(P2 − W )
(2 − α1 )(P − W )

Next, for the β = 0 case, we show that the strategies exhibited in the Proposition do
constitute an equilibrium. Note that P m = VL is the monopoly price that for D1 in its
captive segment. If P2r is set to any price above this, D2 will make no sales at P2r , so it must
price at or below VL . Further, by construction, Gm
(P ) and Gr2 (P ) are best responses by the
1
dealers, so a deviation to prices below P̂ is not profitable either.
Finally, consider Gm
(P ). First, observe that any price above VL is sub-optimal, compared
2
to VL , since it loses all the low type consumers in this segment.14 Suppose D2 sets P2m =
P < VL . There are three effects on profit, as compared to charging P2m = VL .
(a) in its captive segment, of size

α1
,
2

it loses (λL + λH )

α1
(VL
2
m

− P) =

α1
(VL
2

− P ),

(b) in the segment of mass (1 − α1 − α2 ), if P < P2r < P1 , it cannibalizes its own sales, and
e
r
m
r
r
loses an amount (λL + λH ) (1 − α1 − α2 ) Gm
1 (P ) G2 (P ) Prob(P2 < P1 | P2 > P ) {E(P2 |

P < P2r < P1m ) − P }, where E(P2r | P < P2r < P1m ) is the expected price at which the
cannibalized sales were being made (the conditioning event is that P < P2r < P1m ),
(c) finally, in the segment of mass (1 − α1 − α2 ), if P < P1m < P2r , it wins some sales over
m
r
e
from D1 , leading to a gain (λL + λH ) (1 − α1 − α2 ) Gm
1 (P ) G2 (P ) Prob(P1 < P2 | P <

P1m ) (P − W ).
14

The same argument as in footnote 12 works here.
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Replacing the relevant expressions for Gm
(P ) and Gr2 (P ), and evaluating the conditional
1
probabilities and expectations, we find that, in overall terms, the firm loses some profit.
Hence, it will not deviate to P2m < VL .
Step 2 Suppose β = 1. Then, the strategies exhibited constitute an equilibrium.
This step follows immediately from Proposition 1; for β = 1, the game reduces to the
game in Figure 2.
Step 3 : For all values of β ∈ (0, 1), the strategies exhibited constitute an equilibrium.
Notice that Gr2 (P ), the distribution of P2r , is exactly identical in the two cases β = 0 and
β = 1. Further, there is no consumer who observes both an offline price and a manufacturer
referral price. That is, P1 (VH ), P1 (VL ), P2 (VH ), P2 (VL ) are set as best responses only to each
other and P2r , and are not affected by P1m , P2m . Similarly, P1m , P2m are set as best responses
only to each other and P2r . Hence, it is immediate that, given that Gr2 (P ) is the same in
both cases, when β > 0, P1 (VH ), GL1 (P ), P2 (VH ), P2 (VL ), and Gm
(P ), P2m , are mutual best
1
responses. Finally, since Gr2 (P ) is a best response for both the β = 0 and β = 1 cases, it
must continue to be so when β ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) First, note that the strategies of both firms in the β segments of the market have not
changed. Hence, the expected sales of D1 in these segments amount to (from Proposition
2) β



1
2−α1

−

α1
2

amount to



. Consider the sales of D1 in the (1 − β) segments. Its expected sales here

α1 Z VL
(1 − β)
+
(1 − α1 ) Gr2 (P ) g1m (P )dP
2
P̂

!

= (1 − β)

1
α
− 1
2 − α1
2

!

Hence, the total expected sales of D1 (across both sets of segments) are E(S1 ) =

1
2−α1

−

α1
.
2

Since the total size of the market is constant, the expected sales of D2 are E(S2 ) = 1 −
E(S1 ) = 1 −



1
2−α1

−

α1
2



.

(ii) The expected manufacturer referral price of D1 (accounting for the mass point at P m ) is
E(P1m ) = (1 − Gm
1 (VL ))

Z

VL
P̂

P g1m (P ) dP + Gm
1 (VL ) VL

, which yields the expression in the statement of the Proposition. The expected infomediary
price of D2 , E(P2r ) does not change, compared to Proposition 2, since the distribution of P2r
is the same in equilibrium.
(iii) The profit of D1 is
E(π1m )

=

βE(π1o )

+ (1 − β)
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Pm
P̂



α1
+ (1 − α1 )Gr2 (P )
2



(P − W ) g1m (P )dP − F w
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= βE(π1o ) + (1 − β)(

α1 (1 − α1 ) (VL − W )
) − F m.
(2 − α1 )

The profit of D2 , E(π2m ), is
(

Z Pm
α1
(VL − W ) +
(1 − α1 )Gm
+ (1 − β)
(P ) (P − W ); g2e (P )dP
1
2
P̂
α (4 − 3α1 ) (VL − W )
− F m − K m.
= βE(π1o ) + (1 − β)( 1
2(2 − α1 )

βE(π1o )

)

− F m − Km

Proof of Proposition 6
(i) The optimal values of F m and K m follow immediately from the expressions for E(π1m )
and E(π2m ) in Proposition 5, following the same logic as in Proposition 3.
(ii) Note that the total sales of the product are the same in both cases, with and without
manufacturer referrals. Hence, the difference in the manufacturer’s profit is just F m − F o .
Further, in each case, the optimal franchise fee is exactly equal to the gross profits of retailer
1 (that is, the profits without subtracting out the franchise fee). To show that F m > F o , we
show that the difference in the gross profits of D1 is positive.
From Proposition 2 and Proposition 5, the difference in the gross profits of D1 is
(1 − β)

α1 (1 − α1 ) (VL − W )
− E(π1o )
(2 − α1 )

!

= (1 − β){(

α
1
− 1 )δ − λH (VH − W )}
2 − α1
2

1
−
Since (1−β) > 0, this difference is weakly positive if and only if ( 2−α

0, or δ ≥

(2−α1 )α1
λ (VH
2−(2−α1 )α1 H

1

α1
)δ −λH (VH −W )
2

≥

− W ) = δc .

(iii) Recall that acquisition costs are incurred only for consumers who are walking-in offline.
Hence the net increase in channel profits accruing due to savings in acquisition costs is
(1 − β)δ. The net change in manufacturer franchise fees and infomediary referral fees are:
F

m

!

(2 − (2 − α1 )α1 )δ α1 λH (VH − W )
− F = (1 − β)
−
2(2 − α1 )
2
!
α1 λH (VL − W ) 2(1 − α1 )2 δ
m
o
−
K − K = (1 − β)
2
2(2 − α1 )
o

(3)
(4)

The amount (1 − β)δ − (F m − F o ) − (K m − K o ) represents the change in consumer surplus.
This is equal to

(1−β)
2

((2 − α1 )δ + α1 λH (VH − VL )) > 0.

Proof of Proposition 7
(i) From Table 5.1, CR(P1m ) ≤ CR(P2r ) if and only if
1
(1 − α1 )2 + 1
≤
(2 − α1 )2
2 − α1
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⇐⇒ (1 − α1 )2 + 1 ≤ 2 − α1 ,
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or, α1 − α1 2 ≥ 0, which is true since 0 ≤ α1 ≤ 1.
(ii) From Table 5.1, CR(P2m ) ≥ CR(P2r ) if and only if
α1 (2 − α1 ) > 2 − α1 − 2α2 =⇒ α2 ≥

(1 − α1 )(2 − α1 )
2
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